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Non-technical summary
During recent decades European antitrust authorities have increasingly focused on
the fight against cartels within the European market. Numerous alterations in Euro-
pean competition law, such as leniency programs or extensions of the fine spectrum,
have been implemented with the objective to destabilize existing cartels and to deter
potential future cartel agreements. In this context, cartel overcharges constitute one
important indicator for the success and effectiveness of price-fixing. They are defined
as the difference between the collusion price and an artificial competitive bench-
mark price and capture the mark-up for purchasers due to cartelization. The price
overcharge transfers income from purchasers towards cartel members and thereby
crucially determines the size of the deadweight loss. For competition authorities it
is therefore of primary interest to have a clear understanding of the price setting be-
havior of cartels and overcharge analysis can provide valuable insights in this respect.
Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semiparamet-
ric estimation procedures, this paper analyzes in its first part the impact of different
cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges
for the European market. The second part of the paper then focuses on the ques-
tion whether the fine level according to the current EU Guidelines is sufficient for
effective cartel deterrence.
We find that the mean and median overcharge rates are 20.70 percent and 18.37 per-
cent of the selling price and an average cartel duration of 8.35 years. The analysis
reveals further that overcharges attained in Western and Northern Europe are sig-
nificantly lower, and overcharges attained in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and
the UK are not significantly different from reference group overcharges. Regarding
different cartel characteristics, empirical evidence suggests that international cartels
impose higher overcharges than domestic cartels and that cartel experience in terms
of repeated attempts to collude influences the magnitude of overcharges negatively.
Estimation results further indicate that bid-rigging cartels obtain higher overcharges
than non bid-rigging cartels. In addition, we do not find changes in the overcharge
level over time, implying that adjustments in EU competition law during recent
decades did not lead to reservation in the price-setting behavior of cartels. Last
but not least, a comparison between cartel overcharges and the existing fine level
according to the current EU Guidelines shows that collusion has been a lucrative
business for most firms from an ex-post perspective. In 67 percent of the cases the
gain from price fixing outweighs expected punishments although the calculations are
based on maximum values for cartel detection and upper limits of penalty levels. We
therefore conclude that further adjustments of the EU Guidelines are indispensable
in order to achieve optimal deterrence.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten hat sich der Fokus europa¨ischer Wettbewerbs-
beho¨rden zunehmend auf den Kampf gegen Kartelle innerhalb des europa¨ischen
Marktes gerichtet. Zahlreiche Neuerungen im europa¨ischen Kartellrecht, wie zum
Beispiel Kronzeugenprogramme oder Anhebungen des Strafniveaus, wurden mit dem
Ziel eingefu¨hrt bestehende Kartelle zu destabilisieren und potenzielle zuku¨nftige
Kartellvereinbarungen abzuschrecken. Kartellpreisaufschla¨ge stellen in diesem Zusam-
menhang einen wichtigen Indikator fu¨r den Erfolg und die Effektivita¨t von Kartellen
dar. Sie ergeben sich aus der Differenz zwischen dem Kartellpreis und einem hy-
pothetischen Wettbewerbspreis und erfassen damit die Preiserho¨hungen infolge von
wettbewerbswidrigen Preisabsprachen. Der Preisaufschlag fu¨hrt zu einem Einkom-
menstransfer von den Kartellabnehmern hin zu den Kartellanten und bestimmt
damit maßgeblich die Ho¨he des Wolfahrtsverlustes. Fu¨r Wettbewerbsbeho¨rden ist es
daher von großem Interesse ein klares Versta¨ndnis bezu¨glich des Preissetzungsverhal-
tens von Kartellen zu haben und Preisaufschlagsanalysen ko¨nnen in dieser Hinsicht
wertvolle Erkenntnisse liefern.
Das vorliegende Papier analysiert im ersten Teil unter Verwendung einer Stichprobe
bestehend aus 191 Preisaufschlagsscha¨tzungen sowie mehreren parametrischen und
semiparametrischen Scha¨tzverfahren den Einfluss verschiedener Kartelleigenschaften
und des Marktumfeldes auf die Ho¨he des Preisaufschlags in Europa. Im zweiten
Teil liegt der Fokus dann auf der Frage, inwiefern die Strafmo¨glichkeiten in den
gegenwa¨rtigen Europa¨ischen Leitlinien ausreichend sind um eine effektive Kartellab-
schreckung zu erzielen.
Der durchschnittliche Kartellpreisaufschlag sowie der Median betragen 20.70 bzw.
18.37 Prozent des Verkaufspreises und die durchschnittliche Kartelldauer umfasst
8.35 Jahre. Die erzielten Preisaufschla¨ge sind in West- und Nordeuropa signifikant
niedriger, und in Su¨deuropa, Osteuropa und im Vereinigten Ko¨nigreich nicht sig-
nifikant verschieden von den Preisaufschla¨gen aus der Referenzgruppe. Hinsichtlich
verschiedener Kartelleigenschaften zeigt sich, dass internationale Kartelle ho¨here
Preisaufschla¨ge erzielen als inla¨ndische Kartelle und dass die Kartellerfahrung im
Sinne von wiederholten Kollusionsversuchen die Ho¨he des Preisaufschlags negativ
beeinflusst. Die Scha¨tzergebnisse deuten zudem darauf hin, dass Bieterkartelle
ho¨here Preisaufschla¨ge verlangen als klassische Kartellvereinbarungen. Hinsichtlich
zeitlicher Vera¨nderungen zeigen die Ergebnisse keinerlei signifikante A¨nderungen des
Preisaufschlagsniveaus im Zeitverlauf an, was darauf hindeutet dass die Anpassung-
en im europa¨ischen Wettbewerbsrecht in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu keiner Zuru¨ck-
haltung im Preissetzungsverhalten der Kartellanten gefu¨hrt haben. Ein Vergleich
zwischen den Kartellpreisaufschla¨gen und den bestehenden Bußgeldmo¨glichkeiten
gema¨ß der Europa¨ischen Leitlinien besta¨tigt, dass die Kartellbildung fu¨r die meis-
ten Firmen aus ex-post Perspektive ein lukratives Gescha¨ft war. In 67 Prozent
der Fa¨lle u¨bertrifft der Kartellgewinn die erwarteten Bußgeldzahlungen, obwohl die
Berechnungen auf maximalen Werten fu¨r die Aufdeckungswahrscheinlichkeiten sowie
den Obergrenzen der bestehenden Bestrafungsmo¨glichkeiten basieren. Wir schließen
daraus, dass weitere Anpassungen der Europa¨ischen Leitlinien unumga¨nglich sind
um eine optimale Abschreckungswirkung zu erzielen.
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Abstract
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using
a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semi-
parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel charac-
teristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is
analyzed. The mean and median overcharge rates are found to be 20.70
percent and 18.37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel du-
ration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic
region of cartel operation influence the level of overcharges considerably.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the currently existing fine
level of the EU Guidelines is too low to achieve optimal deterrence.
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1. Introduction
During recent decades European antitrust authorities have increasingly focused on
the fight against hardcore cartels1 within the European market. Numerous alter-
ations in European competition law, such as leniency programs or extensions of
the fine spectrum, have been implemented with the objective to increase the ef-
fectiveness of cartel prosecution and to achieve better deterrence. Initial successes
regarding a more effective cartel prosecution can be validated with a current statistic
of the European commission. Whereas 21 cartel cases were decided by the European
Commission between 1990 and 1999, the number increased more than threefold to 66
cases between 2000 and 2009.2 On the other hand, this increase in discovered cartels
could also result from a rising number of active price-fixing agreements, suggesting
that cartels are not impressed by recent adjustments in European competition law
and that the aim of optimal deterrence is still not achieved.
One important indicator for the success and effectiveness of collusive agreements
are cartel overcharges (Bolotova, 2009). They are defined as the difference between
the price during collusion and an artificial competitive benchmark price (the so called
but for price) and capture the mark-up for purchasers due to collusion. The price
overcharge transfers income from purchasers towards cartel members. The higher
the price overcharge, the higher the deadweight loss for purchasers and consumers.
For antitrust authorities it is therefore of primary interest to have a clear under-
standing of the price setting behavior of cartels and there are several reasons why
overcharge analysis can provide valuable insights in this respect. Firstly, knowing
different overcharge patterns in dependence of underlying cartel characteristics al-
lows to identify factors fostering cartel success in terms of overcharge level, cartel
life span and repeated attempts to collude. Secondly, certain industries and regional
markets may be identified in which outstanding overcharges are attained and more
in depth screenings should be implemented. And last, descriptive statistics - in par-
ticular average cartel duration and mean overcharge level - can be used in order to
assess the success of price-fixing agreements. This enables antitrust authorities to
approximate existing fine levels to the point of optimal deterrence.
The empirical literature on cartel overcharges primarily originates from Connor
and Bolotova (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and mainly deals with the US and in-
ternational market. A separate econometric analysis of the European market is
new to the best of my knowledge.3 Using a data set with 191 overcharge estimates
1Hardcore cartels are defined as “... a group of firms who have agreed explicitly among themselves
to coordinate their activities in order to raise market price - that is, they have entered into some
form of price fixing agreement.” (Pepall et al., 1999, p. 345).
2See the official statistics of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/competition, last
accessed on June 6th, 2012.
3It is worth noting that Connor and Lande (2006) analyze European overcharges in one section
of their paper. However, their analysis is descriptive and targeted on implications for fining
policies in the EU and USA. The present paper therefore constitutes the first detailed analysis
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solely for the European market, the paper at hand bridges this gap and presents a
well-founded econometric analysis in this respect. Even more important than the
geographic region is the methodological framework of this study, as in addition to
the current parametric procedures two semiparametric regression methods are ap-
plied.
Specifically, the following questions that can be important for antitrust authorities
in Europe will be clarified in this paper:
1. Which factors influence the size of cartel overcharges in Europe? Do cer-
tain cartel characteristics (duration, international or domestic, legal or illegal,
number of repeated attempts to collude) as well as the legal and geographic
environment of cartel operation have significant impact on the magnitude of
overcharges?
2. During recent decades European antitrust policy has experienced a steady
process of growth. The foundation of a common European competition policy
was laid down in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Carree et al., 2010). Since that
date European antitrust law has continuously been revised in order to increase
efficiency in cartel prosecution and to improve the deterrent effect.
Did these changes over time (introduction of leniency programs, increase in
fine levels) significantly reduce the magnitude of cartel overcharges?
3. In 1998, the European Commission introduced Guidelines on the method of
setting fines for the first time. These guidelines were revised in 2006 to increase
the deterrent effect. Is the level of punishment according to the current EU
Guidelines sufficient for effective deterrence?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains basics on cartel overcharges
and summarizes the existing literature. Information about the data set and the case
selection procedure are given in section 3 and descriptive statistics are presented in
section 4. The estimation results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 deals with
the question whether the current existing fine level of the EU Guidelines is sufficient
for effective deterrence. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results
in section 7.
of European overcharges that uses multivariate approaches and also captures regional differences
within Europe.
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2. Cartel overcharges
Cartels are anticompetitive agreements between rivals who collectively attempt to
control market prices and/or output quotas. The fundamental incentive for firms
to take part in collusive agreements is that they can generate a supra-competitive
profit that is higher than the sum of the profits of each potential member absent
from collusion. The cartel success in terms of monetary reward thereby crucially
depends on two factors, the duration of the period the cartel is able to raise prices
above the competitive level without being discovered by antitrust authorities, and
the magnitude in which but for profits are exceeded. The latter factor is reflected
in the cartel overcharge, which is defined as the difference between the price during
collusion and an artificial competitive benchmark price. The benchmark price cap-
tures the price purchasers would have been paid without a collusive agreement in
the concerned market and is therefore not observable.4
In the context of empirical analysis, cartel overcharges are usually not used directly,
but in terms of a relative measure. Bolotova et al. (2008) distinguish between two
overcharge rates, where the first is calculated as a ratio of the price overcharge to the
price during collusion (formula 1) and the second as a ratio of the price overcharge
to the benchmark price (formula 2):
OvRate(1) = Pcollusion−PbenchmarkPcollusion
OvRate(2) = Pcollusion−PbenchmarkPbenchmark .
As both approaches depend on the same parameters and only differ regarding the
price in the denominator, both formulas can basically be used for estimation pur-
poses. However, the first one has at least two important advantages over the second.
Firstly, overcharges calculated with formula 1 have an upper boundary of 100 per-
cent, while overcharges computed with formula 2 would partly yield values far above
100 percent. Secondly, the mean overcharge calculated with formula 1 can be di-
rectly compared with the level of cartel sanctions defined in European antitrust law.
These sanctions are calculated as a proportion of the value of affected sales, which
allows a deduction of evidence concerning the deterrent effect of the existing fine
level (Bolotova, 2009). This is the reason why the first overcharge rate is used in
the course of this paper.
The existing literature on cartel overcharges can be subdivided in an empirical and
a more theoretical oriented part. The theoretical strand of literature - not further
considered here - focuses on cartel overcharges as the starting point for damage
quantifications in the context of competition law enforcement. In this regard, con-
tributions by Verboven and van Dijk (2009), Han et. al (2009) and Basso and Ross
4A summary of different quantitative methods for estimating this “but for price” can be found in
Davis and Garces (2010), Chapter 7.
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(2010) must be mentioned. By comparison, empirical surveys on cartel overcharges
primarily originate from Connor and Bolotova.
Connor and Bolotova (2006) conduct a meta analysis of cartel overcharges in order
to determine the impact of different cartel characteristics as well as the method of
calculation (yardstick, historical case study, price before/during/after conspiracy as
benchmark price etc.) and publication source (journal, court or antitrust authority,
monograph etc.) on the magnitude of overcharge rate. Bolotova et al. (2007)
consider an empirical analysis of food industry cartels. Bolotova (2009) analyzes
the impact of cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude
of overcharges attained by cartels in different geographic markets and during six
antitrust law regimes. Last but not least, Bolotova et al. (2008) consider this
relation in a separate empirical paper solely for the US market.
These surveys yield mean (median) overcharge rates between 20.71 and 28.88 (17.10
and 20) percent, depending on the type of overcharge rate, the data used and the
case selection procedure. Regarding the impact of cartel characteristics and the
market environment on the magnitude of overcharges, all estimations mainly show
a consistent tendency. International cartels impose significantly higher overcharges
than domestic cartels. Cartel duration and cartel market share also seem to influence
the magnitude of overcharges positively. On the other hand, overcharges enforced by
bid-rigging or guilty cartels are not significantly different from overcharges attained
by non bid-rigging or legal cartels. Moreover, their results suggest that overcharges
realized in the US and European markets are lower than in the reference market
(Rest of the world) and that the lowest overcharges are associated with the latest
antitrust law period.
In this investigation the same data basis as in the articles by Connor and Bolotova
is used, but there are at least three important differences that should be mentioned.
Firstly, we solely concentrate on the European market, whereas Connor and Bolo-
tova either use US overcharges or overcharges from all over the world. A separate
analysis for the European market is important as it enables us to capture regional
variations in Europe. This facilitates to identify geographic areas within Europe
where surpassing overcharges are attained and thus contain lucrative framework
conditions for cartels. Secondly, a separate European study allows to compare the
mean overcharge level enforced by cartels in the European market with the existing
fine level according to the current EU guidelines. We will use such a comparison in
order to decide whether the sanctions are sufficient for optimal deterrence or further
adjustments are indispensable. Thirdly, in addition to current parametric estima-
tion methods two semiparametric procedures (Censored Least Absolute Deviations,
Symmetrically Censored Least Squares) are used in this paper in order to account for
non-normality problems of the error terms. In addition, comparing the results be-
tween parametric and semiparametric procedures as well as among semiparametric
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methods enables robustness checks regarding significance and validity of the results.
3. Data set and case selection procedure
We use part of the data provided by Connor (2010) in the Appendix Tables 1 and 2 of
his paper. The original data set contains 1517 overcharge estimates referring to 381
product markets. The data were collected from approximately 600 sources and refer
to the period between 1770 and 2009. They originate from court and commission
decisions, OECD reports, peer-reviewed journals, books, dissertations, government
reports and other sources. In most cases these sources already contain overcharge
calculations, in the rest of the cases, Connor used price data to estimate them on
his own. The cartel overcharges were calculated using different methods (before-
and-after, yardstick etc.) and are stated as overcharge rates pursuant to formula 2
(ratio of the price overcharge to the benchmark price). To analyze cartel overcharges
for the European market, we use part of this data and employ the following case
selection procedure.
First of all, we solely select cartel overcharges that are related to the European
market.5 In most cases the geographic location of the cartel participants coincide
with the concerned market.
Furthermore, the original data set contains two types of overcharge estimates, av-
erage and peak overcharges. The latter usually refer to the most successful period
during cartel activity. According to Bolotova (2009) we chose the average level
of overcharge, as it represents the cartel impact over the full period of conspiracy.6
Since the overcharges are stated as overcharge rates pursuant to formula 2 they were
transformed into overcharge rates as percentage of price during collusion (formula
1).7
Analogous to Bolotova (2009) and Bolotova et al. (2008) every observation in the
sample represents one cartel episode, whereas one cartel episode is regarded as an
uninterrupted period of collusion with a corresponding set of rules and membership.
It is possible that some cartels are represented by more than one cartel episode and
therefore contribute multiple observations to the data set. Reasons for this are tem-
porary breakdowns due to opportunistic behavior of cartel members, changes in the
market environment or changes in the internal structure of cartel agreements (Bolo-
tova, 2009). Consequently, it is assumed that the overcharges of several episodes
5The European market is composed of member states of the EU and countries that geographically
belong to Europe (Swiss, Norway, Iceland etc.).
6There are a few cases in which only peak overcharges are available. In order to compile a data
set for Europe as large as possible, we checked these peaks in detail and incorporate ten into
the sample. These observations do not represent outliers.
7Apart from the mentioned advantages of formula 1 over formula 2, this is also useful for another
reason. Before the transformation, the minimum, maximum, mean and median overcharge
values were 0, 450, 33.44 and 21 percent, afterwards these values are 0, 81.82, 20.7 and 18.37
percent. That is, the distribution of cartel overcharges is less skewed after the transformation.
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of the same cartel differ due to theses aspects. This is the reason why each cartel
episode is treated as one observation unit in the data set.8
For some cartel episodes several overcharge estimates are available. This is due
to the fact that the same cartel episode was analyzed by a number of authors or
multiple estimation methods were used in a single survey. In such cases the median
overcharge estimate was selected. Altogether the data set consists of 191 overcharge
estimates for the European market.
Apart from the geographic region and magnitude of overcharges, the Appendix
Tables in Connor (2010) also contain information on cartel membership (domestic
or international), cartel legal status (illegal or legal), cartel beginning and ending
dates and whether it is a bid-rigging cartel or not. All this information is included
in the data set and used in the upcoming descriptive statistics and econometric
analysis.
4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the entire data set. The mean cartel
overcharge in the European market is 20.70 percent and the median is 18.37 percent
of the selling price. Regarding cartel durability the average cartel duration is 8.35
years and the corresponding median is 5 years. The shortest cartel merely existed a
few weeks and the longest almost survived 71 years.
The average cartel experience in terms of the number of repeated attempts to
collude is 0.52.9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean S.D. Variable Mean S.D.
Overcharge (%) 20.70 15.63 Eastern Europe 0.01 0.10
Duration 8.35 11.10 Southern Europe 0.06 0.23
Experience 0.52 1.30 Northern Europe 0.07 0.25
Domestic 0.48 0.50 P1 (until 1945) 0.41 0.49
Bid-rigging 0.20 0.40 P2 (1946-1956) 0.08 0.27
Legal 0.28 0.45 P3 (1957-1977) 0.08 0.28
Europe 0.33 0.47 P4 (1978-1989) 0.10 0.29
United Kingdom 0.31 0.46 P5 (1990-2009) 0.33 0.47
Western Europe 0.22 0.42
8For econometric estimations the observations were clustered among cases. The overall data set
consists of 191 overcharge estimates that refer to 129 cartel cases.
9The number of repeated attempts to collude (experience) for one observation is calculated as the
number of cartel episode of the underlying observation minus one.
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48 percent of the cartels are domestic in membership and 52 percent are interna-
tional. In this survey a cartel is assigned to the domestic group, if all members
belong to the same country. If two or more members originate from different coun-
tries, the cartel is considered as international. 20 percent of the observations in the
sample represent bid-rigging cartels and 28 percent legal cartels. Legal cartels are
those that predate antitrust laws or that were authorized by a government authority,
illegal conspiracies in contrast are those that were found or pled guilty (Bolotova,
2009).
The geographical distribution of the observations is as follows. One third of the
overcharges refer to several European countries or alternatively to several member
states of the EU and 31 percent to the United Kingdom. Overcharges that relate
to one single country within Western Europe represent 22 percent of the data. Of
these, solely 80 percent are allotted to Germany and France. The rates for single
countries within Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe are 7, 6 and 1 percent.10
In order to evaluate the success of European antitrust policy, five periods of time
were defined. Every single period represents a more effective and severe antitrust
law in comparison to its predecessor and each observation is assigned to the period
in which the beginning date of the cartel episode lies.11 41 percent of the cartel
episodes start in the period until 1945 and 33 percent in the period between 1990
and 2009. With 8 and 10 percent the remaining overcharges are almost evenly spread
among periods 2 (1946-1956), 3 (1957-1977) and 4 (1978-1989).
As the overcharge estimates were collected from numerous different sources it is
essential to check the origins more detailed in order to ensure adequate data quality
(see Table 2).
Table 2: Data sources.
Variable Mean S.D. Variable Mean S.D.
Book/Monograph 0.22 0.42 OECD 0.07 0.25
Journal 0.13 0.34 Nat. antitrust authority 0.12 0.33
Paper 0.09 0.29 Several sources 0.10 0.30
EC 0.21 0.41 Other sources 0.06 0.23
22 percent of the overcharge estimates were collected from books and 13 percent
originate from articles of scientific journals. Papers from scientific institutions, re-
ports by the European Commission and OECD articles represent 9, 21 and 7 percent
and national antitrust authorities provide 12 percent of the observations. 10 per-
cent of the data come from several sources and can not explicitly be allotted to one
10The allocation in Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe is based on the Classification
of the United Nations Statistics Division. The only difference is that the UK is treated separately
and not as part of Northern Europe.
11The periods will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.1.
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category.12 The remaining observations derive from other sources (presentations on
conferences, speeches etc.) and merely represent 6 percent. Hence, altogether at
least 84 percent of the data either originate from scientific sources or other reliable
institutions, indicating that the quality of the underlying data basis is sufficient for
estimation purposes.
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Figure 1: Mean and median overcharge rates for different case selection procedures.
As previously mentioned, the mean and median overcharge values (20.70 and 18.37
percent) are based on the median principle in the course of the case selection pro-
cedure. That is, the median value has been selected when multiple overcharge es-
timates for a single episode were available. To illustrate the impact of the case
selection procedure on the magnitude of mean and median overcharge rates, Figure
1 contains these values for the minimum and maximum case selection procedures.
If the minimum estimate is chosen instead of the median (Minimum principle), the
mean and median cartel overcharges for the European market amount to 16.56 and
13.19 percent of the selling price. Conversely, if solely peak overcharges for Eu-
rope are chosen (Maximum principle), the corresponding values are 27.27 and 24.81
percent. The use of the median principle in this survey can be justified in that it
describes the cartel impact more suitably. Minimum and maximum principle would
probably under- and overestimate the true impact.
Figure 2 illustrates the Kernel density estimation as well as the distribution of the
overcharge rates in 5-percentage-point ranges. As with increasing overcharge inter-
vals the number of observations tends to decline, the distribution can generally be
12This is due to the fact that the median overcharge is used if several overcharge estimates are
available for one cartel episode. Thus, in case of an even number of overcharge estimates for
a single episode the median is calculated out of two values and these usually originate from
different sources.
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characterized as left skewed. 30 observations are associated with the smallest inter-
val between 0 and 5 percent. Of these, 15 observations have zero values indicating
that approximately 8 percent of ineffective cartel episodes existed in which cartelists
were not able to raise prices above the competitive level. With 162 observations (85
percent) most of the overcharge rates fall within the range between 0 and 35 per-
cent. The interval with the highest overcharge rates (80-85 percent) merely contains
2 observations, in which 81.82 percent of the selling price is the maximum value.
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Figure 2: Distribution of overcharge intervals (5-percentage-point ranges) and Kernel density es-
timation.
Figure 3 illustrates the mean overcharges depending on different cartel charac-
teristics. With 20.61 and 20.73 percent the difference in the magnitude of mean
overcharges between bid-rigging and non bid-rigging cartels is negligible. The mean
overcharge rate of illegal conspiracies (21.42) is 2.59 percentage points greater than
for legal cartels (18.83). This seems surprising as legal cartels predate antitrust laws
or were authorized by a government authority and illegal cartels in contrast can not
impose exorbitant overcharges without catching attention of antitrust authorities
to themselves. Nevertheless, illegal cartels are confronted with additional costs in
order to coordinate their behavior in secret and this could be reflected in the higher
overcharge rate. The most obvious difference regarding the magnitude of the over-
charge rate is cognizable between domestic (16.39) and international (24.71) cartels.
The latter ones imposed overcharges that are more than 8 percentage points greater
than their domestic counterparts and 4 percentage points greater than the average
overcharge rate of the entire sample. This indicates that international cartels are
9
particulary harmful for purchasers and consumers.
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Figure 3: Mean overcharge rates by cartel type.
Figure 4 summarizes the mean overcharge rate and average cartel duration within
different geographic regions of Europe.13 It can be seen that in Southern and Eastern
Europe the highest overcharges emerge (26.94 and 24.67 percent).14 Simultaneously,
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Figure 4: Mean overcharge rates and average cartel duration within different geographic regions
of Europe.
the cartel duration in these regions is clearly below average (3.26 and 2.67 years).
On the other hand, Northern Europe shows up the longest average cartel duration
(13.51 years) and coevally the second lowest overcharge rate (15.36 percent). These
13In this Figure Europe contains all observations of single countries within Western, Eastern, North-
ern and Southern Europe as well as those observations that refer to several European countries
(excluding the UK).
14Due to the small number of observations for Northern Europe, the result for this area should be
considered with caution.
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results suggest that high overcharges alert antitrust authorities early on and vice
versa.15
Western Europe is characterized by the lowest mean overcharge rate (12.56 percent)
and a cartel duration almost according to the average (8.37 years). Cartels in this
region seem to have the most unfavorable framework conditions.
The comparison between Europe and UK shows, that the mean overcharge rate
in both regions is almost identical and the variation in the average cartel duration
merely yields 0.69 years (8.57 years for Europe and 7.88 years for the UK).
5. Econometric analysis
5.1. Empirical Model and Hypotheses
In order to analyze the impact of different cartel characteristics as well as the legal
environment on the magnitude of cartel overcharges for the European market, the
following model is estimated:
OvRatei = α+ βCi + γPi + ϕGi + i.
The dependent variable is the overcharge rate according to formula 1 and depends
on several vectors, each containing a number of independent variables. Ci is com-
posed of two continuous and three binary variables representing cartel characteris-
tics. These include cartel duration, cartel experience, cartel membership, whether
the cartel is legal or not and whether it is a bid-rigging cartel or not. Pi consists
of four binary variables representing four antitrust law periods and describing the
evolution of European antitrust law. Vector Gi contains five binary variables char-
acterizing different geographic regions within the European market (Western E.,
Eastern E., Northern E., Southern E. and UK).16
Cartel characteristics
Cartel duration is one indicator for the stability and effectiveness of collusive agree-
ments. The longer a cartel operates without being discovered by antitrust authorities
or facing a cartel breakdown (internally) the more successful it is. In principle the
relation between cartel duration and magnitude of overcharges is conceivable in both
directions. On the one hand it is assumed that cartels with longer lifetimes tend
to realize lower overcharges, as reservation in price policy reduces the probability of
detection. Furthermore, with increasing cartel duration the danger of market entries
15This is also reflected in the trend line, which shows a negative slope.
16It is worth noting that we do not include a set of industry dummy variables to control for differ-
ences in market structures. This is due to the fact that including them results in insignificance
for almost all coefficients and a F-test yields that the set of industry binary variables is not jointly
significant. Furthermore, comparing the two model specifications (with and without industry
dummies) regarding different information criterions (BIC, AIC, CAIC) as well as applying a
Likelihood-ratio test confirms that the latter version should be used.
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of new competitors increases. Due to the continuously high price level, rivals may
try to catch demand by underselling the cartelized product. Hence, the cartel could
temporarily be forced to revise the price downwards in order to prevent market en-
tries. On the other hand, cartels with a longer life span are more experienced and
can have a stronger impact on the price variance control than a less successful and
stable cartel (Bolotova, 2009). This would indicate a positive relation between cartel
duration and overcharge rate. Nevertheless we expect the estimated coefficient to
be negative.
International cartels are likely to obtain higher overcharges than domestic cartels.
Resulting from the bounded legal power of domestic antitrust authorities, cartels
with members from two or more different countries are more difficult to prosecute
than their domestic counterparts (Bolotova, 2009). Moreover, international car-
tels often eliminate import competition that domestic cartels are subjected to. On
the contrary, due to the geographic distance and cultural differences, international
cartels could be faced with communication and coordination problems and this prob-
ably counteracts success (Bolotova, 2009). Altogether, the estimated coefficient for
domestic cartels is expected to be negative.
Collusive agreements on the basis of public tenders (bid-rigging cartels) are ex-
pected to attain higher overcharges than other types of collusive conducts. Mem-
bers of bid-rigging cartels can use the reported information in order to monitor the
behavior of the other participants and to detect cheating (Bolotova, 2009). This im-
proves cartel stability and cartel success and the corresponding coefficient is therefore
expected to be positive.
In contrast to illegal conspiracies, legal cartels need not conceal their behavior from
antitrust authorities. Hence, it can be assumed that legal cartels impose higher
overcharges than those that operate illegally. On the contrary, illegal cartels are
confronted with additional costs in order to coordinate their behavior in secret.
These higher costs could be reflected in higher overcharges and this would counteract
the first effect. In summary, we expect no significant difference between legal and
illegal cartels regarding the magnitude of overcharges.
Cartels often experience more than one cartel episode and the number of repeated
attempts to collude indicates cartel stability and efficiency in that regard.17 Another
attempt to collude signalizes that the cartel has not been successful in raising the
price to the targeted level in the preceding period(s) (Bolotova, 2009). Therefore, we
expect the sign of the estimated coefficient regarding cartel experience to be negative.
17Reasons for temporary breakdowns are e.g. opportunistic behavior of cartel members, changes
in the market environment or changes in the internal structure of cartel agreements (Bolotova,
2009).
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Legal environment
Apart from cartel characteristics we expect that the legal environment influences the
magnitude of overcharges. We take the legal environment into account by means of
two factors, the geographic region and the date of collusion.
Concerning the geographic region we expect the overcharges to be lower in countries
with more severe antitrust laws and more efficient antitrust authorities, as cartels
in these regions find less attractive framework conditions for their machinations and
are stronger deterred by comparison. Within Europe, antitrust authorities located
in Germany, France and the UK are commonly seen as the most developed and pro-
gressive ones. Following this reasoning we expect the overcharges in Western Europe
and the UK to be significantly lower, and the overcharges attained in Southern and
Eastern Europe to be significantly larger than the overcharges of the reference group.
For Northern Europe no significant difference from reference group overcharges is
expected. The reference group is represented by overcharges that refer to several
countries within Europe and that can not be explicitly attributed to one of the be-
fore mentioned regions.
In order to evaluate the success of European antitrust policy, five periods of time
were defined. Every single period represents a more effective and more severe an-
titrust law regime in comparison to its predecessor. During the first period of time
(until 1945) cartels could almost act undisturbed in Europe, as neither in single Eu-
ropean countries nor at pan-European level effective antitrust authorities existed.
Hence, we expect the highest overcharges in this period and it represents the refer-
ence group for the following antitrust law regimes.
The second period between 1946 and 1956 is characterized by initial antitrust
ideas that were established by law within single European countries. In Germany
this happened in 1947 and in the UK not before 1956 (Connor, 2010). The Treaty of
Paris which established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 can also be
allotted to this period. Apart from the main objective to create a common market
for these products, articles 60, 65 and 66 also included prohibitions of discrimination,
cartels and mergers (Schmidt, 2005).
The starting point of the third period (1957-1977) is 1957, in which the Treaty of
Rome followed on the Treaty of Paris. With this convention the European Economic
Community has been established and it is considered to be the date of founding of
European competition policy. This is reflected in Article 3(1)(g) of the Treaty which
defines as one of the main objectives the accomplishment of a system ensuring that
competition in the internal market is not distorted (Carree et al., 2010). Aside
from that, the German Bundestag passed the Act against Restraints of Compe-
tition (GWB) in 1957 and one year later the German Federal Cartel Office was
established. Furthermore, the first illegal cartel was successfully convicted by the
European Commission in 1969 (Connor, 1999).
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The fourth period between 1978 and 1989 is characterized by a considerable in-
crease of discovered cartels. While only five cartels were punished by the European
Commission in the seventies, the number rose to 16 cases during the eighties (Con-
nor, 1999). The year 1989 in which the European Council passed the Merger Control
Regulation builds the end of this period.
The latest antitrust law regime spans from 1990 to 2009 and contains numerous al-
terations in European antitrust law that have been implemented with the objective
to increase the effectiveness of cartel prosecution and to achieve better deterrence.
They include amongst others the European leniency program, which has been intro-
duced in 1996 and closer adjusted to its US counterpart in 2002 and the European
Guidelines on the method of setting fines, that have been introduced in 1998 and
revised in 2006. Furthermore, this period is characterized by a well-directed focus of
decision making on the basis of recent findings in theoretical Industrial Organization,
leading to a “more economic approach” in European competition law.
Under the assumption that each antitrust law regime represents a less favorable
and more deterrent environment compared to its predecessor(s) and that cartels
react to these changes via price restraints, the signs of the estimated coefficients for
periods 2, 3, 4 and 5 should be negative and decreasing relative to the reference
period 1 (until 1945). On the other hand it is also thinkable that some firms are
deterred by these antitrust law changes and therefore refuse cartel participation
at all, whereas those who agree deliberately respond to increasing fines via rising
overcharges in order to make expected profits more lucrative. This would suggest a
positive impact. Altogether, we expect the first effect to dominate and therefore a
decreasing trend in the overcharge level over time.
5.2. Estimation Procedures and Data Issues
We estimate the empirical model using two parametric (OLS, Tobit) and two semi-
parametric (CLAD, SCLS) procedures. As eight percent of the overcharges are
corner solutions with zero values, Tobit seems to be an appropriate alternative to
OLS. However, Tobit needs homoscedastic and normal distributed errors and test-
ing these assumptions results in violations. To account for these problems, Censored
Least Absolute Deviations and Symmetrically Censored Least Squares are used as
alternatives to Tobit. The CLAD estimator is only based on the “zero median”
assumption and therefore neither needs homoscedasticity nor normal or symmetric
distributed errors for consistency. SCLS in contrast is restricted to error terms sym-
metrically distributed around zero, which implies that both median and mean are
zero (Chay and Powell, 2001).18
Furthermore, due to the type of data used in this survey, there are at least two
problems that should be discussed. Firstly, the sample solely contains overcharges
that were selected by the author and that refer to discovered cartels on which infor-
18For contentual and technical details on CLAD and SCLS, see Powell (1984) and Powell (1986).
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mation is available. Therefore, the data set has features of a non-random sample and
this could bias results. Undiscovered cartels are likely to attain lower overcharges
and do not attract attention of antitrust authorities to themselves for that reason.
Hence, the mean overcharge level of this sample is probably greater than in a perfect
random sample.
The second issue concerns omitted variables. As the overcharges originate from
numerous different sources it is difficult to collect information about the same ex-
planatory variables for each case. This means that several variables that are likely to
affect the magnitude of overcharges (number of members, market share) are omitted
and this could also bias estimation results via endogeneity.19
Due to the illegal nature of cartels and the general problem of gathering information
about them, we have to accept these issues. Nevertheless, the signs and significance
of the estimated coefficients should have priority and the exact magnitude of them
should not be overinterpreted.
5.3. Estimation results
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results.20 The OLS results suggest that more
experienced cartels attain lower overcharges. On average, another attempt to collude
decreases the magnitude of overcharges by 1.37 percentage points, even though this
effect is only significant at the ten percent level using a one-sided test. The negative
sign confirms expectation, as a higher number of repeated attempts to collude implies
less stability and therefore less cartel success.
Domestic cartels achieve overcharges that are almost 8 percentage points lower than
overcharges obtained by international cartels. This effect is highly significant and
confirms expectation that international cartels with participants located in different
countries show a clearly higher overcharge pattern and are therefore particulary
harmful for consumers. Moreover, estimation results indicate that bid-rigging cartels
attain overcharges that are 4.71 percentage points higher than those of non bid-
rigging cartels. On the contrary, there is no significant difference between cartels
that were found or pled guilty and legal cartels. The impact of cartel duration on
the magnitude of overcharge rate is also not statistically significant. It seems that
the mentioned effects cancel out each other to such an extent, that the negative
impact (a higher overcharge rate increases the probability of detection and lowers
19E.g. the number of cartel members (omitted variable) is assumed to be negatively correlated
with cartel duration (endogenous variable). Coincidentally, the number of cartel members is also
assumed to be negatively correlated with the magnitude of overcharges. Thus, cartel duration
is overestimated in the present survey.
20Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For OLS, robust standard errors were generated.
The standard errors for CLAD and SCLS were calculated using bootstrap techniques (1000
repetitions). In order to make OLS and Tobit results comparable, the marginal effects are
reported for Tobit. As one observation represents one cartel episode and not necessarily one
cartel case, the observations were clustered among cases.
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Table 3: Estimation results.
Variable OLS Tobit CLAD SCLS
Duration -0.04 (0.10) -0.06 (0.11) -0.01 (0.16) -0.12 (0.24)
Experience -1.37* (0.97) -1.32* (0.97) -1.43* (1.1) -1.28 (3.34)
Domestic -7.78*** (3.45) -8.39*** (3.47) -9.37** (4.82) -13.41* (9.95)
Bid-rigging 4.71* (3.69) 5.25* (3.72) 6.01* (3.90) 5.57 (5.45)
Legal 3.67 (4.60) 2.36 (4.63) 5.26 (5.54) 6.49 (6.73)
P2 (1946-1956) -8.00 (7.23) -7.28 (7.26) -9.72* (7.08) -12.30 (15.13)
P3 (1957-1977) 0.56 (3.76) 1.64 (3.52) 3.21 (5.70) 4.17 (10.58)
P4 (1978-1989) -1.03 (4.43) -0.86 (4.58) 3.65 (7.91) -1.50 (11.53)
P5 (1990-2009) -1.27 (4.34) -1.11 (4.18) 1.65 (6.49) -0.16 (11.12)
Western Europe -12.39***(3.13) -13.60***(3.25) -15.17***(4.26) -16.15***(6.00)
Eastern Europe -3.09 (7.41) -3.60 (7.00) - - -2.83 (7.37)
Northern Europe -9.08*** (4.28) -9.68*** (4.42) -11.32***(5.66) -6.86 (8.29)
Southern Europe -2.77 (9.28) -3.81 (9.45) -1.22 (11.59) -5.62 (7.86)
United Kingdom 3.00 (5.03) 3.15 (4.97) 4.10 (7.41) 9.26 (8.14)
Constant 26.80*** (4.41) - - 23.76*** (6.51) 25.19*** (12.65)
R2 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.35
***Significant at the 5%-level using a two-sided test.
**Significant at the 10%-level using a two-sided test.
*Significant at the 10%-level using a one-sided test.
cartel duration) does not prevail as expected.
Regarding different antitrust law regimes, the results contradict expectations. Al-
though periods 2, 4 and 5 show negative signs, the estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant. Thus, more severe antitrust regulations do not seem to lead
to reservation in the price-setting behavior of cartels.
This finding is surprising and indicates that cartels acting in Europe are not de-
terred by recent adjustments of national and pan-European antitrust laws. However,
as mentioned before one could also argue that exactly these fine adjustments in pre-
ceding years encouraged cartel participants to increase their overcharge level. As
the fine level becomes higher some firms might decide to either reject collusion at
all (optimal deterrence) or to start collusion and demand exorbitant overcharges in
order to outweigh expected punishments. Following the latter reasoning as well and
taking both arguments together, the insignificant changes in the overcharge level
during the five antitrust law periods are not unexpected.
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the change in the magnitude of over-
charges is only one indicator for deterrent effects of antitrust law adjustments. Other
factors such as cartel stability in terms of cartel duration, number of repeated at-
tempts to collude or internal uncertainties due to leniency programs must be taken
in to account as well. In this context it is worth noting that both cartel duration
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and repeated attempts to collude decreased noticeably in the latest two antitrust
law periods, indicating destabilization and deterrent effects of antitrust law changes
over time.
Cartel overcharges considerably differ regarding the geographic region of cartel op-
eration. Overcharges that refer to single countries within Western Europe are 12.39
percentage points lower on average than overcharges of the reference group and the
corresponding coefficient is highly significant. A similar result is observed for single
countries within Northern Europe. It seems that antitrust authorities and antitrust
laws in these two regions are more effective by comparison. In contrast, overcharges
attained in single countries within Southern Europe, Eastern Europe or the UK are
not significantly different from reference group overcharges. Cartels in these loca-
tions seem to have more attractive framework conditions by comparison. Testing the
null hypothesis of no statistically significant differences among overcharges attained
in these five geographic markets results in rejection (p-value is 0.000). Altogether,
the geographic market of cartel operation within Europe seems to be an important
determinant of the overcharge level.
The results of the Tobit estimation merely show marginal differences to OLS. Both
significance and values of the estimated coefficients mostly coincide with OLS, which
implies that the eight percent of corner solution outcomes only have little impact.
Nevertheless, Tobit estimation requires homoscedastic and normal distributed er-
ror terms for consistency and both assumptions are violated. That is, we have to
use CLAD and SCLS as alternatives to Tobit. Both estimation procedures neither
need homoscedasticity nor normal distributed errors for consistency and the results
slightly differ from the parametric estimation procedures. The standard errors rise,
which is probably due to the resampling method (bootstrapping). As a consequence,
significance of some explanatory variables (especially SCLS) decreases.
The conspicuous differences in the magnitude of coefficient estimates between para-
metric and semiparametric procedures as well as between CLAD and SCLS can be
used as a sort of specification check following Chay and Powell (2001). The CLAD
estimators serve as benchmark in that regard, as they neither need homoscedasticity
nor symmetrically and normal distributed errors for consistency. The differences in
the magnitude of estimates between CLAD and SCLS on the one side and Tobit
Maximum Likelihood estimation on the other side suggest, that non-normal errors
are one source of bias in the Tobit results. The conspicuous deviations between
CLAD and SCLS further imply that asymmetric distributed errors also lead to mis-
specifications in Tobit and SCLS estimations.
Nevertheless, comparing the values of the estimated coefficients between OLS, To-
bit, CLAD and SCLS, all procedures show the same tendency. With the exception of
two insignificant coefficients (period 4 and 5), the signs of all explanatory variables
coincide and significance of OLS, Tobit and CLAD is limited to the same group of re-
gressors. Consequently, we can deduce meaningful statements regarding the impact
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of cartel characteristics and the legal environment on the magnitude of overcharges.
The exact values of the estimators however should not be overinterpreted due to the
data and specification issues mentioned above.
6. The deterrent effect of EU competition law
The adjustments of European antitrust law during recent decades have been imple-
mented with the main objective to increase the effectiveness of cartel prosecution
and to achieve better deterrence. Especially the introduction of leniency programs
and the increase in fine levels since 1996 were targeted on a destabilizing impact on
existing cartels and a more deterrent effect for potential future cartel agreements.
At this point it is important to investigate whether the current existing fine level is
sufficient for optimal deterrence or further future adjustments are indispensable to
achieve this aim.
In general, it is not straightforward to answer the question of optimal deterrence
since a number of observable and unobservable factors must be taken into account.
However, with given information on the average cartel overcharge level in the Euro-
pean market and the given penalty levels according to EU competition law we try to
shed some light into this issue by concentrating on the economic decision situation
a cartel is confronted with when thinking about collusion.
If firms exclusively think about collusion as an economic decision to increase profits
and refrain from ethical principles, the question to be answered is whether the
gain from price fixing outweighs expected punishments. Hence, it is obvious to
compare the imposed cartel overcharges with the current penalty level of the EU
Guidelines. To consider this issue formally, let pi be the probability of detection,
Pcollusion the price during collusion, x the amount of sold goods, OvRate(1) the
average overcharge rate over the entire cartel period based on formula 1 derived
above and ϕ the maximum possible fine level per year of cartel operation, which is
defined as a proportion of affected sales in the EU Guidelines. For existing fine level
to deter firms from collusion, the gain from price-fixing must be smaller than the
expected fine. Hence,
OvRate(1) · (Pcollusion · x) < pi · ϕ · (Pcollusion · x) (1)
must be fulfilled, where
ϕ = 30% + (25% ÷ cartel duration).
According to the current EU Guidelines on the method of setting fines, ϕ is com-
posed of a base fine and a so called “entry fee”. The base fine can amount up to 30
percent of the value of affected sales of the firm during the last full business year of
its participation in the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of partici-
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pation.21 The entry fee is between 15 and 25 percent of the value of affected sales,
irrespective of the duration of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement.22
This penalty level can then be adjusted either upwards or downwards depending on
whether aggravating or/and mitigating circumstances exist. Aggravating circum-
stances comprise recidivism, refusal to cooperate and role of leader in (or instigator
of) the infringement.23 For recidivism, the penalty “will be increased by up to 100
percent for each such infringement established”.24 Although this can basically lead
to penalty levels that are a multiple of ϕ, the upward adjustment by the commission
has never exceeded 100 percent in reality so far. According to Veljanovski (2011)
“only one firm (Akzo in Calcium Carbide) was surcharged 100 percent for four pre-
vious offenses, which could have attracted a maximum uplift of 400 percent”.
Now reducing the turnover in (1) leads to the following condition:25
OvRate(1) < pi · ϕ . (2)
If the average overcharge rate is smaller than the expected fine, firms will not
participate in a collusive agreement. Such a direct comparison is only possible
because the fines in European antitrust law are specified as a proportion of affected
sales and the overcharge rate is defined as a percentage of selling price. That is,
both sides of the inequation are related to the price during collusion and therefore
comparable.
In order to apply term (2) to the given cartel data set, we need additional infor-
mation regarding the probability of detection in Europe.
Economic theory suggest that only 10-33 percent of illegal cartels are caught. Con-
nor and Lande (2006) cite several surveys that state probabilities of detection be-
tween 10 and 33 percent. A survey by Combe et al. (2008) for the European market
results in probabilities between 12.9 and 13.3 percent. They use a sample consisting
of data for all cartels that have been convicted by the European Commission since
1969.
We can put these information together and check whether the above given inequa-
tion is fulfilled or not. In this context one should think about which overcharge level
21See Guidelines on the method of setting Fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation
No 1/2003, (2006/C 210/02), paragraph 21.
22Id. at 21, paragraph 25.
23Id. at 21, paragraph 28.
24Id. at 23.
25It is worth noting that this approach compares annual gains from price-fixing with the expected
fine that has to be paid per year of cartel participation. Thus, both overcharge rate and turnover
on the left hand side of inequation (1) are annual average values over the entire cartel period.
The turnover on the right hand side by contrast refers to the last full business year of cartel
operation. The approach is therefore based on the assumption that the average turnover equals
the turnover of this last business year which should not be a very crucial issue. Furthermore,
we neglect aggravating circumstances at this point and abstract from the possibility of private
damage claims which probably increases deterrence. This issue is at least indirectly taken into
account by using a probability of detection of 33 percent instead of 12.9 or 13.3 percent calculated
by Combe et al. (2008) for Europe.
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and average cartel duration to use. As we draw the comparison of gain from price
fixing and expected punishments on the current situation in Europe, it is reasonable
to use the mean overcharge rate and average cartel duration of more recent price
fixing agreements instead of the whole sample. Thus, average cartel duration (5.7
years) and mean overcharge rate (21.9%) for illegal cartels of the latest antitrust law
regime (1990-2009) is employed.
Now given the average cartel that has been active for 5.7 years and calculating
with the upper limits of fine and probability of detection, the expected fine (right-
hand side of inequation (2)) for this average cartel can amount up to a maximum
of 0.33 · [30% + (25% ÷ 5.7)] = 11.46% of affected sales per year over the entire
cartel period. With a mean overcharge rate of 21.9 percent of selling price per year
(left-hand side of inequation (2)), the currently existing fine level seems to be too
low to achieve optimal deterrence.
Apart from this aggregate examination, we can also apply inequation (2) to each
individual cartel case. If we take all illegal cartels from the entire sample as basis, in
67 percent of these cases the cartel overcharges exceed the corresponding maximum
possible fine levels.26 Thus, for more than two out of three cartels, price-fixing
has been a lucrative business from an ex-post perspective although the underlying
calculations are based on maximum values for probability of detection and fine levels.
This is remarkable and confirms the insufficient status quo of cartel deterrence.
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Figure 5: Ratio of cartel overcharge to expected fine.
26If we use all illegal cartels that were active after 1989 as basis, this proportion is 67 percent as
well.
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In order to get an intuition how far cartel gains exceed expected punishments,
Figure 5 contains the distribution of the ratios of overcharge rate to maximum
possible fine level for all illegal cartels from the sample. It is apparent that there
is a substantial fraction (37 percent) of cartels which attained price-fixing profits
to the extent that they are more than double as high as the expected sanction.
Those cartels would not be deterred even if the fine would have been increased by
100 percent due to recidivism. In 17 cases (13 percent of the observations) the
overcharge level is even at least three times higher than the underlying maximum
possible fine level. If one were to target on deterring those firms from collusion, the
probability of detection, the levels of sanction or both parameters must be increased
substantially.
A similar result regarding the insufficient deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines can
be attained following an approach of Connor and Lande (2006). The European
Guidelines restrict the just mentioned fine level to the effect, that the fine can only
amount to a maximum of 10% of the total turnover in the preceding business year.
Calculating with a probability of detection of 33%, a mean cartel overcharge of
21.9% and an average cartel duration of 5.7 years, the optimal fine for an average
cartel should amount to (3 · 5.7 · 21.9%) = 374.49% of affected sales. Such a level
of fine seems to be unattainable with the limitation to 10% of the total turnover
in the preceding business year. To sum up, the incentives to take part in collusive
agreements still appear to be too high in order to achieve optimal deterrence.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that certain cartel characteristics as well
as the geographic location of cartel operation are important determinants of the
overcharge level in the European market and that the current existing EU Guidelines
on the method of setting fines are insufficient for effective cartel deterrence.
The mean and median overcharge rates are 20.70 and 18.37 percent of the selling
price and the average cartel duration is 8.35 years. International cartels impose
higher overcharges than domestic cartels. Cartel experience in terms of repeated
attempts to collude influences the magnitude of overcharge rate negatively; the op-
posite effect is observed for bid rigging cartels. OLS and Tobit estimation results
indicate that bid-rigging cartels attained significantly higher overcharges than non
bid-rigging cartels. This is important to that effect that the European Guidelines
do not explicitly differentiate between bid-rigging and non bid-rigging cartels. By
contrast, the US Guidelines contain such a distinction (bid-rigging cartels are pun-
ished with higher fines) and estimation results of Bolotova et al. (2008) for the US
market show no significant difference between bid rigging and non bid rigging cartels
regarding the magnitude of overcharge level. Thus, an adjustment of the European
Guidelines to its US model concerning this point should be investigated in more
21
detail.
Overcharges achieved in Western and Northern Europe are significantly lower, and
overcharges attained in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and the UK are not sig-
nificantly different from reference group overcharges. Cartels operating in the two
latter regions therefore seem to have more attractive framework conditions for their
illegal behavior.
Results on the success of European antitrust policy during recent decades are con-
trary to expectation. We do not find empirical evidence that more severe antitrust
regulations lead to reservation in the pricing policy of cartels. Nevertheless, for
unambiguous statements regarding this point other factors like cartel duration and
cartel stability - not discussed here - should be taken into account as well.
Last but not least, empirical evidence suggests that the current existing fine level
of the EU Guidelines is too low in order to effectively prevent firms from cartel
participation. Cartel sanctions should be based on the principle of deterrence, im-
plying that expected punishments should outweigh the gains from price-fixing. With
given information on overcharge levels and cartel durations of recent illegal cartels
in Europe and results on the probability of detection from other sources we come
to the conclusion that this is not the case. Hence, effective deterrence is not achiev-
able with the current level of fines, suggesting further adjustments of the European
Guidelines.
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Appendix
Definitions of explanatory variables
Explanatory variable Definition
Cartel characteristics
Duration Cartel duration in years
Experience Number of repeated attempts to collude
Domestic =1 if cartel is domestic in membership
Bid rigging =1 if cartel is bid rigging
Legal =1 if cartel is legal
Antitrust law periods
P1 (Until 1945) =1 if cartel episode starts in the period until 1945
P2 (1946-1956) =1 if cartel episode starts in the period of 1946-1956
P3 (1957-1977) =1 if cartel episode starts in the period of 1957-1977
P4 (1978-1989) =1 if cartel episode starts in the period of 1978-1989
P5 (1990-2009) =1 if cartel episode starts in the period of 1990-2009
Geographic markets
Europe =1 if overcharge refers to several European countries
UK =1 if overcharge refers to the United Kingdom
Northern Europe =1 if overcharge refers to one single country within N. E.
Southern Europe =1 if overcharge refers to one single country within S. E.
Western Europe =1 if overcharge refers to one single country within W. E.
Eastern Europe =1 if overcharge refers to one single country within E. E.
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